The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies on Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002 by Petersohn, Ulrich
The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) on Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002
Ulrich Petersohn
University of Liverpool
u.petersohn@liverpool.ac.uk




Abstract: 
Research has long abandoned the view that only states wage war. On the contrary, civil war research has produced an impressive body of literature on violent non-state actors. Still, a particular group of actors – mercenaries – has been widely neglected so far, although they have participated in numerous conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century. Whether their presence aggravated or rather improved the situation is a matter of dispute. Some believe that the additional military capabilities provided by mercenaries help to end civil wars quickly without increased bloodshed, while others deem mercenaries greedy and bloodthirsty combatants who contribute to making civil wars more brutal, while a third opinion differentiates between different types of mercenaries. This article will test the impact of mercenaries on civil war severity. The evidence indicates that the presence of both mercenaries and Private Military and Security Contractors increases its severity.  















For centuries, mercenaries were a common sight on battlefields. Alexander the Great and Napoleon both hired these actors to fight their wars, and even the British Empire employed them to police its colonial possessions  ADDIN EN.CITE (Percy 2007:54-64;Steinhoff 2008:19-20). Mercenaries are fighters who participate in hostilities for pecuniary reward. Moreover, they are not a national of a party to the conflict, and are not integrated into the regular armed forces (Chojnacki et al. 2009:5). With the emergence of the modern sovereign state in the nineteenth century, they have been delegitimized and pushed off the market (Thomson 1994:19). Nevertheless, mercenaries never completely vanished from conflict. On the contrary, they have served in multiple roles, for example, in the civil wars in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s (Musah and Fayemi 2000). More recently the old mercenary breed professionalized itself and transformed into corporate entities, so-called Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) providing military and military support services  ADDIN EN.CITE (Avant 2005:30;Percy 2007, 7;Singer 2003:45). In total, mercenaries have been involved in almost one-third of all civil wars since 1950 (Chojnacki, et al. 2009). 
Surprisingly, the civil war literature has not paid much attention to mercenary involvement in hostilities. One reason may be that the literature has traditionally focused less on the impact of single actors than on structural variables such as regime type, military power, or natural resources (Cunningham et al. 2009:571). Likewise, the PMSC/mercenary literature has not yet investigated in-depth the repercussions of mercenary involvement in civil wars, though some preliminary work has been done on the mercenary-civil war nexus. Christopher Kinsey, for instance, has shed light on the reasons why mercenaries are hired in civil wars (Kinsey 2007). Moreover, Sven Chojnacki et al. provide an exploration of the conditions under which mercenaries are hired in civil wars (Chojnacki, et al. 2009). However, there are only a handful of case studies that investigate the consequences of PMSC and mercenary involvement  ADDIN EN.CITE (Cleary 2002; Francis 1999;Shearer 1998; Vines 2002). 
Even more unsatisfying is the fact that the literature does not agree on the consequences of PMSC/mercenary involvement. Some authors argue that the presence of these actors aggravates the situation in civil wars. The additional military capabilities obtained by mercenary employment enables the parties to intensify their campaigns (Ross 2004). Others also believe that their use has negative repercussions, but attribute this impact to flaws in the actors’ character. In this view, PMSCs/mercenaries are war-lovers, display a disdain for human life, and therefore increase violence  ADDIN EN.CITE (Ballesteros 2000; Rasor and Bauman 2007). Finally, a third opinion claims that only the old breed of mercenaries creates the problems, and not modern PMSCs. On the contrary, according to these authors, the impact of the latter on the dynamic of civil war is rather positive. As commercial actors concerned with their reputation, they do not take advantage of the client and have an incentive to shorten wars and to behave professionally with regard to human rights (Shearer 1998; Zarate 1998). 
In order to sort out the contradicting claims in the literature and to close the research gap, this article investigates how mercenary and PMSC involvement influences the severity of civil war, i.e. whether the presence of these actors increases or decreases the severity of civil war.
The article proceeds in the following steps:  In the first section, the different perspectives of mercenary impact on civil war are presented, and hypotheses are formulated. It is noteworthy that mercenaries are not homogeneous actors. The current debate revolves around ad-hoc mercenary groups and PMSCs. It is widely agreed in the literature that PMSCs are a ‘transformation’ or ‘evolution’ of the old mercenary phenomenon  ADDIN EN.CITE (Percy 2007:7; Singer 2003:45). At the same time there is an agreement that the two actors are different to some degree, yet it is debated whether the differences amount to a difference in kind, i.e. whether PMSCs are non-mercenary actors. The article does not take sides on this issue, but rather includes both perspectives in the analysis. The first hypothesis does treat both actors as similar, while the second hypothesis differentiates between the two. 
In the second section, additional variables that are commonly associated with the severity of civil wars are identified. These variables are: regime type, external intervention, quality of the armed forces, rebel strength, and ethnic and religious polarization. The third section of the paper discusses in more detail the dataset, the operationalization of mercenary actors, and the control variables. 
The final section discusses the results. The analysis shows that the presence of PMSCs/mercenaries is correlated with an increase in civil war severity. However, it was not possible to determine whether there is a difference between the two actors. The presence of natural resources and PMSCs/mercenaries is correlated with an increase in civil war severity in comparison to those conflicts where neither of these factors were present. A surprising result was that the presence of natural resources and PMSCs/mercenaries is correlated with a lower civil war severity than those cases where either natural resources or PMSCs/mercenaries have been present.  

ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF MERCENARIES
Apart from romanticized movies, such as the 1978 film The Wild Geese, mercenaries are a hard sell today. The opponents of mercenarism and of PMSCs reference Niccolò Machiavelli frequently (Carmola 2010: chapter 1). The Italian philosopher complained about the lack of a proper motivation, such as nationalism, and claimed that mercenaries were mainly driven by greed (Machiavelli and Mansfield 1985:48). This predisposition renders mercenaries to be unreliable and ineffective in the fight, as they have no stake in the conflict, and monetary reward has little meaning without a plausible prospect that it can be collected (Lynch and Walsh 2000:143-146). Moreover, James Taulbee raises the question of how civilized a lover of war such as a mercenary can be (Taulbee 1998:154). Not very, many would probably respond. Mercenaries are deemed to have perpetrated massacres, executions, looting, and rape, and spread instability in the conflicts they have been involved in (Burchett and Roebuck 1977:8; Sapone 1999:3).​[1]​
However, the lack of a proper motivation is more a normative judgment than an explanation for mercenary transgressions in war. For instance, military personnel sign up for the service for similar reasons, out of adventurism or hope for a stable income (Pung et al. 2008). A good part of the criticism of mercenarism is rather due to the fact that private forces are less constrained in their use of force than regular forces (Percy 2007:57). Over time, the international community has built sets of norms that shape modern warfare, such as the humanitarian law or the nuclear taboo (Farrell 2005). The overarching aim of these regulations is to restrict the use of force and limit the repercussions of warfare. Moreover, military institutions develop routines that help to control and coordinate the large number of people working within the organization (Posen 1984:44). These routines help to implement international norms, comprise ethical codes, and rules of engagement (Kier 1995:66). In short, a soldier’s use of force takes place within the constraints of accepted rules of warfare and the limitations of the military organization s/he is integrated in. Any transgressions and wrongdoings can be sanctioned by the home state or the military justice system. 
Against the backdrop of constrained use of force by regular forces, Juan Zarate points out that the greatest concern with private actors is that they operate outside these controls: “The international community’s fear of mercenaries lies in that they are wholly independent from any constraints built into the nation state system. The element of accountability … underlies the international antipathy for mercenary activity” (Zarate 1998:122). Hence, mercenaries (including PMSCs) are expected to have the following effect on civil wars: 
PMSC/ mercenary presence is expected to increase civil war severity (Hypothesis 1). 
However, the literature fiercely debates how different PMSCs are from mercenaries. While some have considered PMSCs as “new modalities of mercenaries” (General Assembly 2007:69), “mercenary organizations” (Harding 1997:87), or “half-mercenary, half service sector offshoot” (Spear 2006:5), others have deemed this too simplistic and consider them professional military service providers (Donald 2006:1-6; Shearer 1998:22). It is noteworthy that PMSCs comprise a wide range of actors, including unarmed personnel providing logistic, consultancy and training services, as well as armed personnel delivering security or even combat services to the customer (Singer 2003: chapter 6). As mercenarism is associated with participation in combat, the controversy is only about those PMSCs providing armed security and combat services (Baker 2011:5-6). 
Those who consider the mercenary definition not being applicable to PMSCs emphasize the qualitative differences between the former and the latter. Mercenaries form a temporary fighting force for a particular task with no permanent organizational structure or long-term interest beyond the mission at hand  ADDIN EN.CITE (Kinsey 2006: chapter 1; Singer 2003:44-47). Basically they are ad-hoc groups formed from loose networks of individuals. PMSCs, in contrast, are permanent legal structures. Moreover, the corporation has a long-term interest in establishing itself on the market and generating profit (Dunigan 2011:17-19; Krahmann 2010:7). 
However, others have considered PMSCs and mercenaries to be similar actors. First, they object that a corporate organizational structure, long-term business interest or legal registration and state licensing requirements do differentiate PMSCs from mercenaries  ADDIN EN.CITE (Adams 1999; Musah and Fayemi 2000:22-25; Spear 2006:16-19). According to Uwe Steinhoff this is not to say that there are no differences, but that “these differences remain in the category of mercenaries” (Steinhoff 2008:24-26). Secondly, proponents of the ‘similarity argument’ do not focus the on differences between PMSC and mercenaries, but on those between these two actors and regular soldiers. For instance, one of the key arguments is that mercenaries are fighters lacking close and immediate control by a legitimate authority. This is equally true for the old mercenary breed and the newer PMSC phenomenon (Baker 2011:33 ;Percy 2003). Whether this makes the mercenary label stick to PMSCs does not need to be decided here. 
The crucial difference between PMSCs and ad-hoc mercenaries is their organizational structure, which influences the actor’s integration in the regulatory structure restricting the use of force (Percy 2007:64). The argument is the looser the organizational form, the less integrated and restrained the actor is by the regulatory structure. Due to their loose structure, ad-hoc mercenary groups are considered to be less integrated and hence they are expected to be dangerous, using excessive force and violating human rights. PMSCs, in contrast, are deemed to be more integrated in the control structure, and hence they are expected to employ force in a restrained manner  ADDIN EN.CITE (Krahmann 2010:6 ;Zarate 1998:115). The reasoning for these claims is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The legal constitution of PMSCs makes control of their actions easier and prosecution more likely than in the case of ad-hoc mercenary groups. First, corporations are required to meet legal requirements, such as registration criteria or export licensing (Zarate 1998:148). This entails a degree of transparency, as firms have to give information about their structure, employees, and contracts to the state’s administration. Moreover, licensing procedures give the home state some control over the actions of the firm. If a firm does not meet the necessary standards or breaks laws by exporting services, licenses can be suspended, denied or withdrawn. Similar tools are not available with regard to ad-hoc mercenary groups. Due to their lack of corporate structure, they are not required to provide documentation for their actions and hence operate largely under the administration’s radar. 
Also, theoretically both members of ad-hoc mercenary groups and employees of PMSCs can be held accountable for war crimes (Doswald-Beck 2007:134). However, as PMSCs operate in the open, i.e., responsibilities, contractual ties, and perpetrators are more likely to be known, it is easier for the prosecution to investigate. Admittedly, in some cases the reach of the regulations is still contested, but in international humanitarian law, precedents have been set where companies, even PMSCs, have already been held accountable (Dickinson 2011:45). In short, due to the fact that PMSCs have a permanent legal structure they are more likely to be held accountable than ad-hoc mercenary groups, and hence they are less likely to transgress the norms governing the use of force. 
Another more informal regulatory mechanism is also widely discussed in the literature: market reputation. Deborah Avant has emphasized that a transnational market for force has formed alongside the state system (Avant 2005:3). This is not to say that ad-hoc mercenary groups did not sell their services on a market, however the main difference is that the current market is highly corporatized (Singer 2003:40). As a consequence, the dynamics of the market change. In a competitive market, customers seek to gather information on the agents in order to determine who would best serve the task at hand. The reputation of an agent is an important indicator in this regard (Brauer 2008; Brooks 2000:131). Agents therefore have a strong incentive to satisfy the customer in order to maintain a good market reputation and increase the likelihood of future business. For the mechanism to function properly a permanent corporate structure is required that builds a reputation and to which successes and wrongdoings can be attributed. Hence, PMSCs are subject to the reputation mechanism (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2012:7). A company that is perceived to have committed crimes, violated international law or provided substandard services will suffer a bad reputation and not be successful on the market (Percy 2006:53). If the structure is easily dissolved, however, and the actors can reappear in another shape, the mechanism is rendered ineffective. Hence, ad-hoc mercenary groups do not have to worry too much about the consequences of their actions on their long-term profit. Their network formation bypassed the reputation mechanism of markets. 
	In sum, due to their different mechanisms, PMSCs are assumed to be more integrated in the normative structure governing the use of force and therefore to be similarly constrained in their actions as state actors. Ad-hoc mercenary groups are considered to be not integrated in the normative structure, nor constrained in their behavior. Hence, the following impact on civil wars can be expected:
Ad-hoc mercenary groups can be expected to increase civil war severity in general, while PMSCs can be expected to not aggravate the situation (Hypothesis 2).
Some authors go even further and tentatively suggest that PMSCs might even improve the situation as they increase the likelihood that international norms are adhered to (Avant 2005:61).




Mercenaries and natural resources
According to David Collier and Anke Hoeffler, the presence of primary commodities increases the risk of civil war (Collier 2000). However, natural resources may have an effect not only on the onset, but also on the severity of civil wars. In order to extract resources, such as gemstones, infrastructure and equipment are needed. As such equipment can be easily damaged or destroyed, the conflict parties are required to take control of and stabilize the region if they want to extract gas and oil. In any case, parties are aware of the importance of the resource-rich areas for the war effort. This awareness can be expected to increase the intensity as only successful fighting secures revenues from this area (Lujala 2009:54-55). 
In general it is assumed that if PMSCs/mercenaries are inserted into resource conflicts they fuel the intensity of the hostilities even further, as they see an opportunity to loot (Sapone 1999:14; Fredland 2004:211).​[2]​ In order to carry out the looting they may be reckless against the civilian populations or pay little attention to the rules of warfare. In addition, if the revenue from the resource-rich areas guarantees the payment of the hired PMSCs/mercenaries, they might employ extremely harsh methods to repress any resistance (Ross 2004:58-59). Hypothesis 3 therefore states: 
The combination of natural resources and PMSCs/mercenaries is expected to increase the severity of civil wars (Hypothesis 3).

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONFLICT
The determinants of civil war severity are complex, and this article cannot provide a comprehensive account of all factors. The focus of the analysis will be on the impact of mercenary involvement in civil war. This section specifies the control variables, i.e., the impact of other factors that influence the severity of hostilities. Four variables have been incorporated into the analysis: regime type, external intervention, quality of the armed forces and strength of rebel forces, and ethnic and religious polarization. 

		Regime type: Although there are numerous regime types, this investigation differentiates only between democracies and non-democracies. It is widely acknowledged that the degree to which a country displays the characteristics of a democracy has an influence on the onset of civil wars (Hegre et al. 2001; Henderson and Singer 2000). However, the regime type can have an impact on civil war severity as well. The rationalist approach argues that democratic leaders are elected which puts them under constant pressure to generate benefits for their winning coalition, i.e., the proportion of the population that is required to ensure reelection. Although winning coalitions exist in any system, the size of the coalition is very broad in democracies. This makes it more difficult to generate benefits for a large group, while shifting costs to other parts of society at the same time (Mattes and Morgan 2004). Autocratic leaders rely on a small circle only and can more easily shift costs and distribute benefits (Filson and Werner 2004:303; Mattes and Morgan 2004). Since the costs of war are not fixed, but accumulate over time, it becomes more difficult to deflect costs. Democracies hence try to avoid bloodshed and try to end wars as quickly as possible (Bennett and Stam 1996). 
		Another – normative – perspective on democracies suggests that they are more restrained in their actions during wars. In contrast to non-democracies, where the government can suppress and even eliminate opposition, the political process in democracies is designed to generate compromise between the parties and respects human rights. The normative socialization goes even beyond individual state borders and is applied in foreign policy (Maoz and Russett 1993:625). In essence, both approaches suggest that democratic regimes are less likely to resort to excessive use of force in internal conflicts (Harff 2003; Valentino et al. 2004). 
External intervention: James Fearon suggests that parties in a civil war are faced with a dilemma: even if a peaceful solution exists that both opponents can agree on, the parties lack any guarantee that the other will comply with the settlement. Without a neutral party intervening and guaranteeing that each party adheres to its commitment, hostilities and distrust prevail (Fearon 1995:405-406; Walter 1997:360). Another option for external interference in a civil war is to abandon the idea of the neutral facilitator and to intervene on behalf of one party. Edward Luttwak favors this option and argues that the international community should even intervene on behalf of the strong to defeat the weak more decisively and quickly (Luttwak 1999:38). However, external intervention may also increase the severity of the fighting. The additional capabilities provided by the intervener can – and are meant to – tip the internal balance of power (Krain 2005:369). New military tactics, sophisticated weaponry, or simply the additional manpower might enable one party to strike harder and reach areas that have not been fought over before. As a consequence, fighting can be expected to become more bloody and intense. In sum, external assistance suggests an increase in the severity of hostilities (Lacina 2006:281). 
Quality of the armed forces and strength of the rebels: The importance of the quality of military forces for success in a military engagement has been widely acknowledged  ADDIN EN.CITE (Hanson 2001; Van Creveld 2007). The reason is simple and straightforward: skilled, well-structured, and well-equipped forces are more effective and hence more likely to achieve their military goals (Brooks 2007). However, the quality of the military directly influences not only the outcome, but also the severity of civil war (Keen 1998:28). Ill-disciplined, rag-tag forces are often much more violent than disciplined, well-trained forces. Mueller argues that such forces often consist of little more than armed thugs, who are much more willing than ordinary soldiers to harass, murder, and take whatever loot they can find. 
In addition, if atrocities are committed, a cycle of revenge is set in motion when the brutalized fight back – often with equally ill-disciplined forces (Mueller 2000:47-56). Although at times ill-disciplined troops might turn into a noteworthy fighting force, and a well-disciplined army resort to overly aggressive behavior and atrocities, a high-quality fighting force is in general more likely to fight in a disciplined manner and not to commit crimes (Mueller 2003:510). In short, high-quality forces are less likely to increase the severity of a civil war.
Ethnic fragmentation: Ethnic fragmentation of a society is widely used in the civil war literature to explain civil war onset. However, many consider this factor also to be influential on civil war severity (Fearon 2004; Lacina 2006). First, Chaim Kaufmann argues that ethnic conflicts are different from those fought over ideological issues. The crucial distinction is that ideological affiliations are flexible and can change, while ethnic affiliation is fixed. As a consequence, ideological conflicts can be solved more easily by economic, political, and social reforms addressing the respective grievances (Kaufmann 1996:140-141). Ethnic conflicts, in contrast, are characterized by a deep-rooted antipathy between the groups that is hard to change and which even renders cohabitation in the same territory often impossible (Kaldor 1999). Therefore, each side is willing to bear high costs to defeat the opponent and to achieve complete control of the territory (Kaufmann 1996:139). James Fearon’s “sons of soil” mechanism is a version of this problem. Accordingly, conflict erupts if a dominant ethnic group starts to migrate into less populated regions, often with the support of state development projects. The inhabitants of the periphery, usually an ethnic minority (sons of the soil), then start an insurgency against the migrants and the state backing them (Fearon 2004:283).
Second, groups in ethnic conflicts face an intense security dilemma. If the state has broken down as a neutral institution to regulate conflicts, the various groups have to rely on themselves for protection. However, the arming and mobilization of one group, even for self-defense, poses a threat to the security of others. The severity of ethnic dilemmas increases even further if the settlements of the groups are mixed, as this renders both sides vulnerable to attacks by the opponent’s forces (Posen 1993:28,32). Such vulnerability, combined with the anxiety that the other group will prevail militarily and use this position to expel or even exterminate one’s own group, leads to more severe and determined fighting. In short, all mechanisms suggest that ethnic and religious conflicts are zero-sum situations, where compromise is unlikely, and the stakes are high for all parties. 


OPERATIONALIZATION
In this section, the operationalization of the variables is discussed and the data sources are introduced. The first challenge of civil war research is to define the subject. It has become very common to integrate casualty thresholds in the definition of civil wars. Unfortunately, there is no agreement in the scientific community on where to set the bar.​[3]​ Consequentially, as different surveys use various thresholds, the assessment of violence in the world depends to a great extent on the dataset one is using (Sven Chojnacki quoted in: (Bonacker and Imbusch 2005:115). This article does not intend to solve the debate or fathom its depths. With regard to the data on civil wars, this investigation draws on Bethany Lacina’s dataset (Lacina 2006) which is based on the conflict data of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo.​[4]​ Lacina’s dataset provides detailed data on casualties as it has already been used to investigate questions of civil war severity. Furthermore, she factors in a margin for counting errors and includes civil violence with at least 900 killed.​[5]​ 
The dependent variable “civil war severity” was until recently often considered to be merely a byproduct of hostilities. However, this is not a random phenomenon, but the result of the conditions under which war takes place (Heger and Salehyan 2007:386). Severity refers to the death toll, i.e., all casualties – civilian or military – that result directly from hostilities. The risk with such a criterion is that it might obfuscate the actual humanitarian cost of war, since those who die from war-related hardships, such as famines, are not counted. Since the matter of interest here is the severity of civil war hostilities, it seems to be reasonable to take only those casualties into consideration that are directly caused by combat (Lacina 2006:278). In total, the investigation includes 110 civil wars in the period from 1946 to 2002. However, due to missing data and the removal of extremely influential cases, only 106 cases are included in the “severity models”.​[6]​  The dependent variable “battle deaths” was logged to avoid heteroscedasticity.​[7]​ 
The data on the variable of interest in this investigation “mercenary presence or absence” are drawn from Chojnacki et al. (Chojnacki, et al. 2009). The authors provide a list that includes information on the presence of mercenaries in civil wars from 1946 to 2002. However, as already indicted, there is a fierce debate in the literature on what constitutes a mercenary (Carmola 2010: chapter 1; Steinhoff 2008). Chojnacki et. al. consider mercenaries as fighters who participate in hostilities for pecuniary compensation, and who are neither nationals of a party to the conflict nor members of the armed forces (Chojnacki, et al. 2009:4-6; Percy 2007:58-64). This definition excludes all actors from the dataset who are providing logistics, training or other non-combat services since they are not participating in combat. Furthermore, local fighters, militias and warlords are not included as they hold the nationality of a party to the conflict. Equally excluded are foreigners who serve in the armed forces of a party to the conflict, e.g. members of the French foreign legion (Chojnacki, et al. 2009:5-6). Finally, the dataset includes all actors, who participate in the fighting and who do not fall into one of the excluded categories. This comprises employees of PMSCs, third country nationals, and individual fighters.
In total, PMSCs/mercenaries were present in 35 of the 114 civil wars included in this study (Table 1). It might be suspected that mercenaries are a phenomenon of the Cold War, wherein the superpowers had an interest to use such actors for covert operations. Indeed, during the Cold War mercenaries participated in 27% of all civil wars (in 21 out of 77). However, after the Cold War ended, the presence of PMSCs/mercenaries in civil wars increased slightly. They were present in 38% of all civil wars (in 14 of the 38) that took place between 1989 and 2002. 
Moreover, one might suggest that mercenaries are only present in a particular type of conflict. For instance, it is often argued in the literature that PMSCs/mercenaries are merely present in wars of self-determination, used as a tool of oppression to subdue independent movements (Musah and Fayemi 2000:5-6). However, in total they were only involved in 33% of the secessionist wars present. This does not seem to be a disproportionate engagement in a particular type of conflict as they also participated in 25% of the non-secessionist wars. Most notably, although it is often emphasized in the literature that mercenaries are an African problem, this is by far not the only continent where these actors are active. Indeed, in total most of the conflicts with mercenary presence took place in Africa (thirteen cases). However, with regard to the ratio of total amount of conflicts to conflict with mercenary presence, the most active region was Asia (14:10). Finally, PMSCs/mercenaries were active in five conflicts in South America, in five European conflicts, and two conflicts in the Middle East. 

Table 1: Mercenary presence in civil wars 1950-2002
	Conflicts Total	Conflicts with Mercenaries Present​[8]​
Role of Cold War		
Prior to ‘89	77	21
Past ‘89	38	14
Role of conflict type		
Secessionist	71	24
Non-secessionist	43	11
Region		
Africa	28	13
Asia	14	10
Europe	43	5
Americas	12	5
Middle East	17	2

For further analysis, the variable is coded as a dummy variable. The variable is defined as 0 mercenaries being absent and 1 being present. 
The mercenary definition of the data set comprises individual mercenaries as well as employees of private military companies (Chojnacki, et al. 2009:6). However, it does not explicitly differentiate between the two. In order to include a differentiation between these two types of actors, a “Cold War” dummy variable is introduced: 0 is being defined as representing the dominant presence of PMSCs from the 1990s on, while 1 marks the dominant presence of ad-hoc mercenary forces before the 1990s. 
Admittedly, this differentiation is a broad stroke. However, the coding rests on assumptions widely shared in the literature. The first assumption is that ad-hoc mercenary groups were more dominant than PMSCs in civil wars during the Cold War. This is indicated by Kevin O’Brian, who claims that the “overwhelming majority of all … private military operations in Africa was characterized by ad-hoc groupings of former soldiers” (O'Brian, 2000:48). Anthony Mockler’s, and Burchett’s and Roebuck’s analysis of the mercenary phenomenon in the 1960s and 70s support this claim indirectly. Both studies corroborate the presence of mercenaries in civil wars, yet neither analysis mentions any corporations providing combat services (Burchett and Roebuck 1977, Mockler, 1985). This is not to say that PMSCs were not in business during the Cold War.  Already during the 1960s and 1970s a tiny PMSC industry existed, dominated by British firms (O'Brian 2000:46). However, while these firms provided security-related services, military and security consultancy, training, commercial investigations and risk assessment, they did not (or rarely did) engage in combat (Kinsey 2006:47,51). The U.K. parliament’s Green paper provides further support for this perspective. Indeed, prior to 1989 PMSC and mercenary were involved in twelve conflicts. However, only mercenaries were reported to have participated directly in combat (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2002:28-38). 
Secondly, the coding further implies that PMSCs became more dominant actors after the end of the Cold War and that the old mercenary outfits decreased significantly in importance at the same time. It is widely agreed in the literature that the end of the Cold War was a watershed for the private military industry  ADDIN EN.CITE (Percy 2007:206; Shearer 1998:23; Singer 2003:49). Formerly loosely organized mercenary groups transformed into organized and legally structured companies  ADDIN EN.CITE (Kinsey 2006:64; Percy 2007:206). PMSCs became the next evolutionary step in military service provision (Singer 2003:45). Moreover, the number of these new PMSCs providing lethal services in conflict zones increased continuously through the 1990s  ADDIN EN.CITE (Avant 2005:7-14; Branovic 2011:23). In essence, PMSCs have assumed a central role in the provision of security and military services (Mandel 2002:14-15). This trend is also considered to coincide with the decrease of individual mercenaries. After 1989, the U.K. parliament’s Green Paper does not find direct involvement of mercenaries in combat in any of the eighteen cases where PMSCs have been present. On the contrary, companies have taken combat roles (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002:28-38). Freelance operators might not have vanished completely, but they have become a very small segment (Kinsey 2006:18). The former mercenary business model became simply “replaced” by corporate players or formerly individual fighters were incorporated in the company databases of potential operators (Kinsey 2006:69; Musah and Fayemi 2000:23). 
Due to the broad support in the literature and some empirical evidence the coding decision appears to be justified. 
The control variable “military quality” is measured as the military expenditure divided by the number of military personnel. It depicts the government’s military capacity one year before the hostilities broke out (Lacina 2006). The variable therefore captures the government’s actual capability to suppress the rebels and is not distorted by a potential upsurge in the capability due to the fighting. “Rebel strength” is the second variable measuring the quality of the forces involved. It is dummy coded, defined as 1 for strong rebel forces being present and 0 for strong rebel forces being absent. Likewise, “democracy” is coded as a dummy variable, and is based on the Polity IV project. The project gathers data on the regime characteristics and assigns scores ranging from 0, being the most undemocratic, to 10, being a fully-fledged democracy.​[9]​ A country was coded to be a democracy if it scored six or higher (dummy 1) and to be non-democratic if it scored 5 or less (dummy 0).  “Ethnic fragmentation” is coded continuously. Finally, natural resources are covered by dummy variables, including both the presence of gems and hydrocarbon production. 

ANALYSIS
The driving interest behind the investigation is to determine the influence of mercenaries on civil war severity. For the analysis an OLS-regression model was chosen. Three different models were calculated: The first model determines the general impact of PMSC/mercenary presence and absence on severity (model 1). The second model differentiates between PMSCs and ad-hoc mercenary groups, and tests for their influence on the dependent variables (model 2). Finally, the influence of the presence of PMSCs/mercenaries in conjunction with the presence of natural resources is investigated (model 3). 

PMSCs/Mercenaries and Civil War Severity 
Model 1 (Table 2) analyzes the impact of mercenaries on the severity of civil war. Most authors in the literature assume PMSCs/mercenaries increase civil war severity (Hypothesis 1).
Table 2: PMSCs/mercenaries’ impact on the severity of civil wars
Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Mercenaries	0.65** (0.27)	0.69** (0.41)	1.57*** (0.53)
Intervention	0.58** (0.25)	0.52** (0.25)	0.56** (0.25)
Democracy	-0.98*** (0.32)	-1.04*** (0.31)	-0.99** (0.31)
Military quality	0.00  (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Strong rebels	0.44 (0.39)	0.44 (0.38)	0.51 (0.39)
Ethnic fragmentation 	-0.03 (0.42)	0.15 (0.41)	0.05 (0.42)
Duration	0.01*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
Cold War		0.58** (0.31)	-
Mercenary & Cold War	-	0.064 (0.52)	-
Nat. resources	-	-	0.58** (0.32)
Mercenary & Nat. resources	-	-	-1.2** (0.61)
Constant	8.08*** (0.29)	7.69*** (0.36)	7.63*** (0.4)
Adj-R2	0.39	0.41	0.41
 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01;  N: 106


The data show that civil war without PMSC/mercenary presence results on average in 6,680 battle-related deaths, while mercenary involvement is correlated with a 65% increases in the number of deaths.​[10]​ This substantial increase lends credence to the concerns of critics that mercenaries in general are brutal and trigger-happy actors. Hypothesis 1 can be confirmed by the data.
According to the model, the control variables “Intervention”, “Democracy”, and “Duration” also contribute to the explanation of civil war severity. In accordance with what the theory predicts, on average, interventions increase civil war severity. In contrast to a civil war where intervention is absent, its presence increases the number of casualties by 58%. This result corroborates other findings in the literature. Bethany Lacina shows that foreign aid and interventions increase the number of battle deaths. Others have found that internationalized conflicts during the Cold War era produced an increase in combat deaths  ADDIN EN.CITE (Heger and Salehyan 2007:396; Lujala 2009:62). 
Furthermore, the results of model 1 support the theoretical claim that civil wars in democracies are less severe. Civil wars in democracies yield on average 98% less casualties than civil wars in non-democracies. This finding exceeds other findings in the literature, but points in the same direction. Lindsay Heger, for instance, finds as well that democracies fight fewer severe civil wars and that casualties are substantially reduced (by 79% on average) (Heger and Salehyan 2007:396). 
Finally, the variable “duration” was incorporated in all severity models as an additional control variable, since longer conflicts may result in more battle- related deaths. Table 2 shows that although duration has a positive correlation with battle-related deaths, the actual increase is very small. For each additional month’s duration of a war, the battle-related deaths increased on average by 0.01%. However, though the increase is small, the general trend that longer wars produce more casualties is in accordance with the broader literature on civil war duration  ADDIN EN.CITE (Heger and Salehyan 2007:396-397 ;Lacina 2006:286). The remaining control variables measuring the rebel strength, military quality, and ethnic fragmentation were insignificant. It can therefore not be said whether these variables contributed to an increase or decrease in civil war severity. 
Based on the results of the analysis, Hypothesis 1 can therefore be confirmed. The presence of PMSCs/mercenaries in civil wars increases their severity.​[11]​

Ad-hoc Mercenary Groups vs. PMSCs
Hypothesis 2 states that ad-hoc mercenary groups increase civil war severity, while PMSCs can be expected to not aggravate the situation. Model 2 (Table 2) investigates the hypotheses and contains the interaction variable “Mercenary and Cold War” to account for the absence and presence of PMSCs, respectively.​[12]​ The “Cold War” and “Mercenary and Cold War” variables are added. Figure 1 displays the results graphically. As a reminder, the Cold War variable was used to differentiate between ad-hoc mercenary groups during the Cold War and PMSCs after the Cold War. Accordingly, four different categories are possible: ad-hoc mercenary presence during the Cold War (CivWar with ad-hoc mercenaries), ad-hoc mercenary absence during the Cold War (CivWar during Cold War), PMSC presence after the Cold War (CivWar with PMSCs), and PMSC absence after the Cold War (CivWar after Cold War).










Figure 1: Effects of ad-hoc mercenary groups and PMSCs on severity


The data show that civil wars after the Cold War without any PMSC presence had on average 4,385 battle-related deaths (CivWar after Cold War). The interaction variable indicates that the presence of ad-hoc mercenary groups during the Cold War is correlated with reduced severity. The negative coefficient is, however, insignificant. As a consequence, it cannot be said whether mercenaries organized in ad-hoc groups during the Cold War have an increasing effect, decreasing effect, or no effect at all on civil war casualties. A direct comparison between the effects of PMSCs and ad-hoc mercenary groups is therefore not possible.
However, the result of model 2 can nevertheless supplement the result of model 1. The presence of PMSCs after the Cold War is correlated with a 69% increase in the number of battle-related deaths (CivWar with PMSCs) in comparison to civil wars where they were not present after the Cold War. While mercenary presence in general is correlated with an increase in civil war severity, PMSCs as a subgroup do not deviate from this trend, as many in the literature suggest. PMSC presence is correlated with an increase in civil war severity as well. The statement of Hypothesis 2 on PMSCs can therefore not be confirmed. 
Against the backdrop of the assumption that PMSCs used force in a restrained manner this result is surprising. One might have expected that they would not increase civil war severity significantly. A potential explanation for this outcome may be, first, that the reputational mechanism fails to restrict the use of force. The reputation mechanism can only restrict force if the customer is interested in the company adhering to the norms of warfare.  However, some clients might care more about the effectiveness of the firms and less about the appropriateness of their actions. Others may decide to hire PMSCs because this allows actions that are not possible with regular forces. Furthermore, for the reputation mechanism to work, the customer needs to be able to make a competent choice. If contracting personnel are poorly trained and do not have knowledge of proper vetting standards, this increases the opportunity for PMSCs to behave improperly without getting punished (Avant 2007, 188-189). 
Second, although there is a legal framework in place to hold companies accountable, there may be a problem with the enforcement of these rules. It is very difficult to gather evidence in a chaotic war environment. Often prosecutors and investigative personnel are not in the area or arrive too late. Additionally, the respective PMSC employees have little interest in being prosecuted and therefore leave the scene. This makes it almost impossible to determine later who fired the shots and provides contractors with the advantage to fly under the radar. Finally, the multitude of contracting departments contributes to the fragmentation of enforcing the regulations as the responsibilities overlap or are unclear (Dickinson 2011:54-65).
In essence, a direct comparison between the effects of PMSCs and ad-hoc mercenary groups was not possible. However, the results of model 2 show that hostilities in civil wars with a PMSCs-presence were more severe than those hostilities where they were absent. 

Mercenaries and Natural Resources
Chojnacki et al. have shown that mercenaries are more likely to participate in civil wars in countries with diamond mines (Chojnacki, et al. 2009:31). Model 3 (Table 2) analyzes the effects of the conjunction between mercenaries and natural resources on civil war severity. Hypothesis 3 stated that the interaction of the mercenaries and natural resources increases civil war severity. Indeed, the data in model 3 shows that there is a significant effect on civil war severity if natural resources and mercenaries are present. Both factors individually are correlated with increased civil war severity. Surprisingly, if both factors are present simultaneously, the casualty rate decreases. The results are graphically displayed in Figure 2. 

Figure 2: Mercenary and Natural Resources’ impact on severity



Conflicts where both factors were absent resulted, on average, in 4,175 battle-related deaths (CivWar). In comparison, mercenary presence is correlated with a 156% increased in the number of battle-related casualties up to 10,688 on average (CivWar with Mercenaries). Surprisingly, when both factors were present, the number of battle-related deaths is correlated with a drop to 8,100 (CivWar with Mercenaries Nat Res). 
The interpretation of the results is not straightforward, but there are a number of possible explanations. In essence, conflicts involving both mercenaries and natural resources had more battle-related deaths than those where both factors were absent. However, according to the logic of Hypothesis 3, one would expect the cases where both mercenaries and natural resources are present to yield the most severe fighting, but in fact this is not the case. Indeed, it can be expected that conflicting parties would fight hard to gain access to natural resources. Surprisingly, the results do not follow this logic. On the contrary, the casualty rate is substantially lower in conflicts where both mercenaries and natural resources are present, compared to cases where only mercenaries are present. The presence of natural resources appears to mitigate the effect of the presence of mercenaries. 
Two variables may explain the reduction in violence. First, in order to drill for oil and gas, and to excavate gems on a large scale, international corporations have to become involved. Such actors are much more visible than the mercenaries on the ground and much more eager not to harm their reputation at home and in the host state (Deitelhoff and Wolf 2010:16). A brutal mercenary-led campaign to clear resource-rich areas in the interests of realizing corporate profit would certainly not strengthen their reputation. It might even spur the international community to impose sanctions and thereby limit business opportunities. In short, due to high visibility, the market reputation mechanism works properly. Through the standards and policies of the international corporations, the mercenaries are forced to comply with humanitarian law. Second, mercenaries themselves may be paid by mining concessions in the war zone. Therefore they develop a long-term investment in the stability of the region. Only if they can stabilize the area and maintain peace are they able to exploit the mining concessions. And so as to not turn civilians into rebels, they employ force in a more restrained manner. 
Despite the ambiguous result, Hypothesis 3 can be confirmed, as conflicts featuring mercenaries and natural resources are more severe than conflicts where both factors are absent. However, surprisingly, conflicts with the presence of both mercenaries and natural resources turned out to be less severe than those where only mercenaries were present.  


CONCLUSION
Are mercenaries brutal warmongers, as some have suggested (Burchett and Roebuck 1977; Scahill 2007)? This investigation has not provided much evidence for the existence of Tony Lynch’s and A.J. Walsh’s “good mercenary” who fights for a just cause (Lynch and Walsh 2000:141), yet also did not contradict it. It may very well be that all mercenaries fight with the best intentions, but in a consequentialist sense, they do more harm than good. Mercenary presence in general is correlated with a dramatic increase in the average number of casualties (see Table 3). However, a more fine-grained analysis allows some specifications. Although it was not possible to compare the impact of PMSCs and ad-hoc mercenary groups directly, results about the PMSC sub-category were obtained. Contrary to the expectation of many authors, PMSC presence does not produce a different outcome from the general mercenary trend. Like all mercenaries, the presence of PMSCs is correlated with an increase in the severity of civil wars compared to those wars where they were absent. 

Table 3: Summary of results of PMSC/mercenary impact on civil war
	Severity
PMSCs/mercenaries	Increase
PMSCs vs. ad-hoc mercenary groups  	-
PMSCs vs. conflict with no mercenary presence 	Increase
PMSCs/mercenaries & natural resources 	
in comparison to civil wars where both factors are absent	Increase
in comparison to civil wars where PMSCs/ mercenaries are present and natural resources are absent 	Decrease

Surprisingly, the factors that are mainly considered to be responsible for more restrained action by PMSCs – legal personality and reputation mechanism – appeared not to have worked. 
The results of the analysis of the interaction between mercenary and natural resources confirmed the concerns of the critics. The presence of both factors was correlated with an increase in the severity of civil war. However, in comparison to conflicts where only PMSCs/mercenaries were present, the interaction of both variables was correlated with a decrease in battle-related deaths. This may be explained by the long-term business interest that either resource extraction corporations or the PMSCs/mercenaries themselves have in the stability of the region. An avenue for further research may therefore be to investigate the influence of the presence of multinational corporations on the behavior of PMSCs/mercenaries.  
The results of this investigation should be considered a first step in a systematic assessment of mercenary involvement in civil wars. First, it needs to be kept in mind that the investigation ended in 2002. There is strong indication that the PMSC market has developed since.  Deborah Avant argues that, independent of customers’ preferences, PMSCs themselves have advanced professional standards. Professions develop a common set of rules and ethical codes, and enforce these standards. The introduction of ethical standards, doctrine, screening, and training requirements for personnel and performance standards allow less leeway to cut costs by providing substandard services. In other words, “fly-by-night firms” and mercenaries are phased out and the behavior of PMSCs today might have improved (Avant 2007:191-194). A renewed investigation of the current market seems to be warranted. 
Second, the results of this investigation rely on the assumption that the presence of mercenaries is exogenous to conflict severity. A major problem is that it cannot be determined when mercenaries entered any given conflict. It might be that conflict severity increased with the arrival of mercenaries. However, there is also the possibility that mercenaries are hired only or more often in conflicts that are fought more intensely. The exogenous assumption needs empirical corroboration. 
Third, this study could only determine whether mercenaries were present or absent in the conflict. However, the tasks mercenaries perform can be expected to have a significant influence on the severity of the hostilities, i.e., it makes a difference whether they are performing advisory tasks or providing active combat. Moreover, mercenary impact might also depend on the scale of their presence, i.e., whether 10 or 100 mercenaries participate in the conflict. None of these factors could so far be taken into account. 
Despite these limitations, the analysis yields two important results. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the qualitative differences between PMSCs and ad-hoc mercenaries appear not to translate into different effects between 1946 and 2002. Furthermore, the general claim that doing evil is in the mercenary’s character (Carmola 2010:17) is not corroborated by the results. The difference between cases where natural resources and PMSCs/mercenaries have been present and cases where only the latter were present hint at the fact that their impact is rather the result of the conditions under which they participate in the fighting. 
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^1	  Similar allegations have been raised against employees of PMSCs (Aning et al. 2008:32; Human Rights First 2008:3-4).
^2	  The hypothesis does not differentiate between PMSCs and mercenaries as the literature discusses similar modes of interaction between natural resources and either of these actors.
^3	  An important definition of civil war is Fearon and Laitin’s, who set the bar at 1,000 casualties (Fearon and Laitin 2003:5). 
^4	  http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/. The data on interventions is based on the Correlates of War project database (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/), data on natural resources drawn from Paivi Lujala’s article “Deadly Combat and Natural Resources” (Lujala 2009), data on ethnic and religious polarization, and military quality is drawn from (Lacina 2006), and data on rebel strength was obtained from (Cunningham, et al. 2009).
^5	  Indeed, this is not systematically different from the 1,000-casualty threshold. However, if one accepts the 1,000 threshold, the inclusion of an error margin is helpful to avoid the influence of minor counting errors on the result. 
^6	  Four cases were not included (Afghanistan 1978-2000, Chinese Civil War 1946-1949, Greek Civil War 1946-1949, Vietnam War 1955-1975). All cases were extreme outliers due to the graphical tests and showed very large residuals.
^7	  The Breusch Pagan test showed a high Chi2 value: 219.37 and Prob > Chi2: 0.00, which confirmed heteroscedasticity. After logging the dependent variable, the problem disappeared in the graphical diagnostics as well as in the Breusch Pagan test.
^8	  Cases with mercenary presence (pre 1989): Costa Rica, India, Laos, Zaire, Chad, Columbia, Nigeria , Cambodia, Lebanon, Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, El Salvador, South Africa, Nicaragua, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan. Cases with PMSC presence (post 1989): India, Azerbaijan, Sierra Leone, Georgia, Bosnia, Croatia, Angola, Russia, Zaire, Congo-Brazaville, Cote d'Ivoire. Some countries had more than one conflict at different points in time. 
^9	  http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
^10	  The logged coefficient is retransformed into actual value for better interpretation (y = ecoeffcient + 0.5*S^2) ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Dambolena</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>1553</RecNum><record><rec-number>1553</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="52dxz9wer2r0x1evtfy5f0scwxt2vfsrft0r">1553</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Dambolena, Ismale</author><author>Eriksen, Steven</author><author>Kopcso, David</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Logarithmic Transformation in Regression: Do You Transform Back Correctly? </title><secondary-title>PRIMUS: Problems, Resources and Issues in Mathematical Undergraduate Studies</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>PRIMUS: Problems, Resources and Issues in Mathematical Undergraduate Studies</full-title></periodical><pages>280-295</pages><volume>19</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>2009</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>. Logged results are interpreted in percentage terms.
^11	  Some may argue that the number of causalties increases because mercenaries increase the number of combatants. However, the number of causalties does not depend on the number of potential targets (Lacina 2006:285-286), but rather on the employed military tactics (Dunigan 2011:31). 
^12	  In model 1, the three control variables of intervention, democracy, and duration likewise contribute to the explanation of civil war severity. The effects in model 2 point in the same direction as in model 1 and are therefore not discussed again.
